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Philosophy in the Epoch of Alternative Facts: An 
Invitation from East Asia 
 
Naruhiko Mikado 




The primary aim of this essay was to elucidate the unique 
philosophical concept of “the non-interpretive”, which Masaya 
Chiba, one of the most prominent philosophers in East Asia, 
formulated mainly by bridging the theories of Quentin 
Meillassoux and Graham Harman, who have generally been 
reckoned as two of the most pivotal proponents in the 
contemporary philosophical movement dubbed Speculative 
Realism. In order to achieve the aim, the first part clarified the 
chief arguments and doctrines of Meillassoux’s Speculative 
Materialism and Harman’s Object-Oriented Philosophy. 
Thereupon, the second and main part investigated how Chiba 
invented the concept, what it precisely meant, and what 
insights it could offer for us. The concluding section 
summarized the chief arguments of this paper and sketched a 
worldview which we could adopt in order to survive the 
turbulent epoch of alternative facts and post-truth. 
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Introduction: Purpose and Context of the Study 
The paramount objective of this essay is dissecting the 
philosophical concept of “the non-interpretive”, which was 
invented by the Japanese philosopher Masaya Chiba. 
Supposedly, both the philosopher and the concept are not 
familiar outside of Japan. Hence, in order to properly situate 
this study in a wider context and to clarify why the concept 
deserves an explication, let me begin this introduction with a 
big question: “What should philosophers do?” Myriads of our 
ancestors have supplied their own answers since antiquity; 
some (e.g., Leibnitz, 2014; Whitehead, 1978) regarded it as 
exploring the fundamental principles of the world, while others 
like Quine (2013) averred that it should be logical analysis of 
language. Besides those stances, not a few philosophers have 
adopted a view that a task of philosophy was to seek a novel 
worldview. The French philosopher Merleau-Ponty (2006) 
spelled out the crux of this type of position, remarking: “True 
philosophy consists in relearning to look at the world” (p. xxiii). 
Put differently, one of the philosophers’ jobs is to provide a new 
perspective. 
In this sense, such figures as Foucault, Derrida, and 
Deleuze were genuine philosophers. As standard-bearers of 
post-structuralism, a sweeping intellectual movement of the last 
decades of the twentieth century, they constituted immense 
contributions to revisions of diverse preconceptions that had 
been naïvely harbored for a long while. Though those post-
structuralists tackled a variety of matters, one could deem it to 
be a commonly accepted fact that substantial emphasis was laid 
upon the notion of difference (Sajed, 2013; Schouten 2010), and 
that an orientation toward relationalism was widely shared 
(Murdoch, 2005; Sampanikou, 2017). Furnishing standpoints on 
which one can ponder issues with a different mindset, the 
arguments of those philosophers proved to be mighty 
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instruments to criticize an ideological regime and a dogmatic 
discourse, helping to correct social discriminations against 
minorities and to disseminate ethics characterized by words 
like co-existence, relationship, and diversity. 
Whereas their cogent theories begot beneficial 
consequences for society, it has been pointed out that those who 
perverted them caused unignorable injurious effects (Ryan, 
1989; Taylor, 1994). The most grievous of them is the 
absolutization of relativism. Relativism denotes an idea that 
“knowledge, truth, and morality exist in relation to culture, 
society, or historical context, and are not absolute.” 
(“relativism”, 2002, p. 1146); as one can facilely fathom out, a 
relativistic thought is quite useful as a tool to scrutinize 
existing, biased conventions. However, when it is exploited as a 
theoretical foundation for an illogical insistence, it can be 
awfully malefic, for, if each person has his/her own measure of 
all things, all normative criteria must be deprived of their 
authenticity. It means that one is required to grant equal rights 
to all evaluative statements, whether it is delivered on the basis 
of scientific evidence or made out of fanaticism. It is often 
maintained that we now live in such a post-truth world where 
there is no absolute truth (Hasian, 2018; Reinhoud, 2019). 
Of course, philosophers have not turned a blind eye to 
this critical state in which one daily encounters arbitrary, 
alternative facts, namely “pseudo-information, presented as fact 
to entice a willing listener or reader into emotional connection 
with the writer or speaker” (Geiser, 2019, p. 9). In actuality, 
theories which strive to set forward a remedy for the situation 
have begun to gain traction recently, and one can adduce three 
conspicuous movements materializing in the philosophical 
sphere: New Materialism, New Realism, and Speculative 
Realism. Contra post-structuralist, relativistic approaches, 
which were indubitably epistemological, their denominations 
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manifestly bespeak that they all have an ontological inclination 
in common, which implies that an interest in the real and hard 
reality is mounting. The thinkers who have exerted probably the 
most significant impacts are Quentin Meillassoux and Graham 
Harman, who are usually held to be belonging to the camp of 
Speculative Realism. Their singular ideas have exercised 
marked influences not only on philosophy but also humanities 
in general. 
These newfangled philosophies have affected the 
intellectual scene of the Far East too, and books which handle 
them have been produced in these years (see Shimizu, 2017; 
Iimori, 2019). No one will gainsay that Masaya Chiba, who 
translated Meillassoux’s masterpiece After Finitude with two 
peers, has contributed most to the promulgation of Speculative 
Realist theories in Japan and is the leading expert on them. 
Having studied Meillassoux’s and Harman’s philosophies since 
2011 and written a number of papers more or less inspired by 
them (e.g., Chiba, 2012a; 2015; 2016), he has evolved his own 
philosophy which, albeit reflecting some influence of post-
structuralism, has carved out an unconventional niche for itself. 
The cardinal keynote of Chiba’s thought is, in a word, non-
relationality. Certainly, non-relationality has been treated by a 
few eminent philosophers of the past like Badiou (2009); still, it 
was rarely a prime issue for a philosophical inquiry. The 
Japanese philosopher signalizes himself in that he has 
continued paying his primary heed to the apparently nihilistic 
topic since his doctoral dissertation (viz., Chiba, 2012b). One 
should be mindful that Chiba has never intended to bring forth 
pessimistic contentions by thematizing non-relationality. 
Rather, what his philosophy has endeavored to do is exploring 
and advancing a new perspective. 
Chiba’s method of achieving this aim is peculiar—
namely, by creating original philosophical concepts that can 
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operate as lenses through which to critique the world from an 
uncommon slant. Amongst them, the concept of “the non-
interpretive” appears to be possessing a promising potential to 
renovate our worldview by enabling us to be aware of the 
ubiquity of non-relationality in the world, to positively 
acknowledge the otherness of different beings, and thus to 
willingly embrace a surprise that another existence may give to 
us at any moment. This is why this paper has set a dissection of 
the concept as its foremost goal. 
To attain the objective, the remainder of this paper is 
composed of three sections. The first section clarifies the chief 
arguments and tenets of Meillassoux’s and Harman’s 
philosophies since they offered vital impetus to Chiba’s creation 
of “the non-interpretive”. Thereupon, the second and main 
section investigates how Chiba invented the concept, what it 
precisely means, and what insights we can gain from it. The 
concluding section gives a rundown of the whole discussion, 
and then sketches a worldview that one can adopt to live 
through the turbulent epoch of alternative facts and post-truth. 
 
Speculative Realism: Meillassoux and Harman 
As I observed just now and as Chiba (2016b) himself indicated, 
he achieved the invention of “the non-interpretive” principally 
with the aid of perceptive arguments which he learned from 
two novel philosophies grouped under the generic label of 
Speculative Realism, though other thinkers who are not 
reckoned as its major constituents (e.g. Laruelle and Malabou) 
had also exerted some influence. The two Speculative Realists 
whose ideas offered Chiba the most substantial inspiration for 
the formulation of the concept are Quentin Meillassoux, the 
originator of Speculative Materialism, and Graham Harman, 
the Iowa-born mastermind of Object-Oriented Philosophy 
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(OOP). In the light of the circumstances, below I will provide a 
brief review of the marrow of their philosophical systems. 
* 
For a starter, let us check out the term Speculative Realism, the 
meta-category that covers the Speculative Materialism and 
Object-Oriented Philosophy among its branches. We should 
note that it is an uncommonly extensive classification, so that 
the theories reckoned as being under the banner often differ 
remarkably from one another, say, in the agenda, in the 
primary objectives, and sometimes even in the fundamental 
principles. For example, there are some (e.g., Brassier, 2007) 
who advocate a nihilistic materialism, whereas others (e.g., 
Grant, 2006) pursue a vitalistic model.  
Still, there is a handful of shared elements that loosely 
unite the batch of those sundry theorists. The most crucial of 
them is the will to refute, in Davies’ (2017) phrase, “the 
dominant paradigm in post-Kantian philosophy” (p. 51), which 
Meillassoux (2008a) identified as “correlationism”, scilicet, “the 
idea according to which we only ever have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either 
term considered apart from the other” (p. 5). By contrasting it 
with other stances in philosophy, Harman (2011a) offered a 
limpid explanation of the common adversary for Speculative 
Realists: 
What all have in common is their rejection of … 
‘correlationism’. Whereas realists assert the existence of a world 
independent of human thought and idealists deny such an 
autonomous world, correlationism adopts an apparently 
sophisticated intermediate position in which human and world 
come only as a pair and cannot be addressed outside their 
mutual correlation. (p. vii) 
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This challenge to correlationism is, in fact, the very reason why 
Speculative Realism gathered huge momentum soon after its 
advent and has become a sensation, for, as Sparrow (2014) 
astutely stated, correlationism has been “the default 
attitude…of most continental, as well as some analytic, 
philosophy since Kant (p. 86), and, in Brassier’s (2007) words, 
“the reigning doxa of post-metaphysical philosophy” (p.50); in 
a nutshell, Speculative Realists have flung down the gauntlet to 
a presupposition of virtually all philosophies from Kant’s 
transcendental idealism to post-structuralist thoughts. 
Some may want to ask why Speculative Realists consider 
correlationism so problematic that it should be disclaimed, 
remembering that those who would be reckoned as being 
trapped in it have pulled off undeniably respectable 
accomplishments. True, correlationist philosophers, 
unconsciously positing that “there is neither human without 
world nor world without human, but only a primordial 
correlation or rapport between the two” (Harman, 2011c, p. 78), 
have ever improved our knowledge of the world as it relates to 
us and vice versa, and we should not disesteem those feats like 
the corrections of inequalities fostered by social 
constructionism, for which post-structuralists—archetypical 
correlationists—purveyed effective theoretical devices.  
Yet we should not overlook problems pertaining to it, and 
two of them are especially serious. The first is 
anthropocentrism. Meillassoux (2008a) revealed that, as long as 
one, whether implicitly or explicitly, accepts correlationism, 
he/she cannot literally understand a scientific statement 
describing a primeval occasion which happened before the 
emergence of human consciousness, while Harman (2010) 
showed that correlationism should, wrongly, incapacitate us 
from discussing interactions between existences “unless some 
human observer is on the scene to witness these interactions” 
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(p. 156). In short, all shapes of correlationism are, by privileging 
the human-world relation, bound to require a philosopher to 
focus on human-centered matters, interdicting him/her from 
philosophizing any reality in itself. The second and gravest 
problem is, as I intimated in the introduction, the radicalization 
of relativism; this is a natural consequence of an extreme form 
of correlationism, because it, alleging that each single subject 
can never gain access to reality beyond his/her experience of it, 
enjoins the subject to equate reality as it is experienced. 
As Morton (2013) asserted with vehemence, the excessive 
predominance of correlationism and the attendant 
anthropocentric and relativistic bend in philosophy ought to be 
redressed now. Hence, along with the endeavor to confute 
correlationism, Speculative Realists aspire to “a return to 
speculating the nature of reality independently of human 
thought” (Le Grande, 2019, p. 3). To express it in another 
fashion, a philosopher who can be tagged as a Speculative 
Realist is purported to work to “decenter humans as the 
ultimate arbiters of what can be said to exist and have 
experiences” (Dudley, 2014, p. 329), and to “think beyond 
human finitude” (Ellis, 2018, p. 141). Briefly, Speculative 
Realists have sought to reinstate existences and phenomena that 
are not necessarily related to humans as proper themes for a 
philosophical exploration. Needless to say, both Meillassoux 
and Harman have pursued this target, and, as the segments 
below will clarify, each of them has demonstrated interesting 
axioms in the course of refining his own system. 
* 
Keeping the commonality in mind, we should then identify the 
singular qualities which differentiate Meillassoux and Harman. 
In truth, they have more differences than similarities. One of 
them is the scale on which each of them has theorized to 
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invalidate correlationism. Allow me to quote their words which 
convey the gist of their orientations: for the former, what 
philosophers, after a lapse of scores of years, should do again is 
“to think a world without thought—a world without the 
givenness of the world” (Meillassoux, 2008a, p. 28), while the 
latter deems it necessary “to bring the things-in-themselves 
back into discussion” (Harman, 2011b, p. 171). To sum up, what 
has interested Meillassoux is the world without humans, 
whereas Harman’s OOP has been concerned with existences in 
general, which he has called objects, namely, in a lucid 
paraphrase, “individual entities of various scales” (Campbell et. 
al., 2019, p. 122). If there were ample room for discussion, I 
would fain elucidate their argumentations. Still, they are too 
convoluted to be thoroughly explicated by hundreds of words; 
wherefore the passage below expounds on only the cardinal 
theses which the two theorists substantiated with logical 
references. 
Since the publication of his groundbreaking opus After 
Finitude in 2006, Speculative Materialism of Meillassoux has 
intrigued dozens of thinkers in both public and academic 
circles, and the past decade or so has seen a profusion of 
writings that dealt with it. In a breviloquent phrase, Speculative 
Materialism is the philosophy of absolute contingency. Though 
the ways in which people have interpreted Meillassoux’s 
thoughts vary considerably from each other, one can affirm that 
the proposition which has aroused people’s interest most is 
what he termed “the principle of unreason”, wherewith he 
issued a wondrous assertion: There is no reason for anything to 
be or to remain the way it is; everything must, without reason, 
be able not to be and/or be able to be other than it is” 
(Meillassoux, 2008a, p. 60). What decisively sets Meillassoux 
apart from religious gurus and dogmatic metaphysicians is that 
he succeeded in setting forth this glancingly preposterous thesis 
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with quite persuasive reasoning and coherent vindications (see 
Meillassoux, 2008a, pp. 50-81). Extremely simply put, 
Meillassoux, though limiting the scope of his discussion to the 
world and its laws, demonstrated that both ostensibly stable 
items are utterly outside of our hermeneutic grasp and 
absolutely contingent, and thus, that no one can deny a 
possibility that they could transform at any moment into any 
form. 
Meanwhile, being a prolific writer, Harman has produced 
lots of works concerning OOP, which he first advanced in his 
doctoral dissertation published in 1999, and the philosophical 
system has indeed been greatly polished up and enlarged upon 
since that time. Nevertheless, without a doubt, the most crucial 
pillar, or, as Harman (2005) termed it, “a single basic tenet” (p. 
20) of OOP has been unchanged; it is the concept of 
“withdrawal”, which Harman (1999) formulated with 
convincing solidity through an inventive construal of 
Heidegger’s famous tool-analysis (see pp. 103-216). Therewith 
he has proved that every single one of existences cannot be 
“reducible neither upward nor downward” (Harman, 2010, 
p.36), i.e. to its parts nor to its whole, and goaded us to heed, in 
a word, the inexhaustibility that is inherent in every entity. 
Mind that not only humans are unable to know every property 
of a being; instead, he has averred that “things withdraw from 
contact with each other in their mutual inexhaustibility” 
(Harman, 2013, p. 126). In sum, Harman has demonstrated that 
every one of the existences in the world, from an elementary 
particle through a chair to Jupiter, always retains and remains 
something absolutely unknown and unknowable. 
Though I admit that the explanation above is patchy and 
in no way sufficient to bring the genuine spirit or 
comprehensive overtones of Speculative Materialism and OOP, 
let me repeat the most consequential point. In substance, 
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Meillassoux and Harman, by emancipating philosophy from 
the manacles of correlationism, have dealt a smashing blow to 
the human-centric tendency which has afflicted most 
philosophers for these two centuries and forcefully negated 
immoderate relativism that wayward post-structuralists has 
propagated. Given that their original arguments have 
stimulated people around the world and engendered new ideas 
in various spheres other than philosophy, one can deem 
Meillassoux and Harman to be authentic philosophers. Upon 
this basis, I will move on to the prime topic of this project: the 
anatomization of Chiba’s “the non-interpretive”. 
 
The Non-interpretive 
In the anterior section, we have taken a rough survey of the 
basal creeds of the two camps of Speculative Realism which 
acted as the vital catalysts for Chiba’s creation of “the non-
interpretive”. Ahead of a detailed inspection of the concept, its 
purport ought to be clarified to make the following exposition 
more digestible. Chiba (2016b) once defined it in a memorably 
laconic manner as “what is absolutely non-relational to any 
interpretation” (para. 32); to couch it in more colloquial terms, it 
stands for what no one can ever make sense of, what is entirely 
outside of any understanding at all, and “what exists just there, 
being intrinsic to itself” (Chiba, 2015, p, 118). On first hearing, 
not a small number of people would adjudge the notion to be 
quite bizarre. What one would count as more eccentric is that 
the philosopher even went to maintain that everyone, 
everything and every phenomenon is, in one sense, “the non-
interpretive”, which he, in one sentence, enigmatically 
described as “an ontological schizoid or a psychopath” (Chiba, 
2015, p. 125). I concede that many will have difficulty in 
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fathoming its significance; still, the concept contains, as I will 
evince, tremendous potential to expand our horizons. 
* 
First off, let us examine how Chiba shaped “the non-
interpretive” in his 2015 essay as a result of his study into 
Speculative Materialism and Object-Oriented Philosophy. 
Whereas one cannot dispute that Meillassoux and Harman had 
served as the most consequential guiding lights for the 
invention, it goes without saying that what he did in forging 
the unique concept was neither to plagiarize their ideas in an 
incautious manner, nor to amalgamate some of them into a 
linsey-woolsey. To cut a long story short, what he did was to 
ingeniously bridge what Meillassoux and Harman had 
demonstrated by identifying their fundamental common 
denominator as an orientation toward the absolute non-relation; 
he observed: “Both Meillassoux and Harman recognize the 
‘absolute non-relation’ as the linchpin of their argument for 
things-in-themselves” (p. 114).  
It would be natural for one to demand an additional 
explication as to why Chiba alleged that the absolute non-
relation could be reckoned as the commonality between 
Meillassoux and Harman, and those who are conversant with 
the precepts of the two thinkers may suspect whether such an 
attribute can really be singled out as a shared strand of them, 
for their theories, as has been pointed out (Morgan, 2017, p. 
162), will impress one as dissimilar from one another except for 
the intent to confute correlationism, namely “a recalcitrance to 
the habit of presuming that the world exists only insofar as 
humans exist to produce it” (MacCormack, 2014, p. 159). For 
instance, aside from the difference I alluded to in the previous 
section, they diverge on their paramount motive for 
philosophizing: Meillassoux’s ultima Thule was, though not 
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evident in After Finitude, to warrant the possibility that God, 
albeit being absent at present, may sometime come to the world 
and realize divine justice by resurrecting the dead who died 
horrible deaths (see Meillassoux, 2008b), whilst Harman’s overt 
purpose has been to flatten the ontological status of all beings in 
the universe (see Harman, 2005; 2011d; 2018). 
Truth be told, Chiba’s dialectics with which he detected 
the absolute non-relation as the common element is, potent that 
it is, nothing less than an acrobatic masterstroke. Paying little 
attention to the specific Holy Grails of the two philosophers, he 
focused on drawing apodictic lemmas from the rationales 
wherewith they had demonstrated the validity of their 
contentions. Let me restate the underlying logic of Speculative 
Materialism and Object Oriented Philosophy; the former 
cogently attested to the reality that the world and the current 
set of natural laws (e.g. physical and logical) could suddenly, at 
any moment, due to the absolute contingency, viz. according to 
the principle of unreason, change into another form; 
meanwhile, by resorting to his extended notion of withdrawal, 
the latter proved that every one of the entities in the universe 
was, being similar to the infinite and absolute Other in the 
Levinasian sense, unable to be, in the crisp words of Whicker 
(2014), “exhausted by any list of its features, parts, capacities, 
uses, or any relation to any other objects” (p. 146). Even if 
compelled to do so, most people could hardly espy a way to 
connect them.  
And yet, this is where Chiba revealed an astounding 
discernment. Let me get directly to the key point; though one 
would find his discussion in the essay intricate a bit, one can 
assume that Chiba put forward two propositions in essence: the 
first was that Meillassoux’s demonstration of the 
unreason/contingency of the world as well as of its laws could 
be seen as proof that they were ultimately non-relational to 
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anything, and the second was that the incessant withdrawal of 
every object, which Harman substantiated with his 
reinterpretation of Heidegger’s tool-analysis, should entail that 
each object must be, in a way at the least, non-relational to one 
another. Having glossed the two distinctive theories in this 
wise, he knit them together in the light of the key phrase the 
absolute non-relation. The following passage conveys the marrow 
of his judgement in a condensed style: “Meillassoux’s The Great 
Outside [i.e. the domain of Kantian noumena] is absolutely non-
relational to the correlation between our thought and the world. 
According to Harman, each one of the things is absolutely non-
relational [with each other]” (Chiba, 2015, p. 114).  
A natural conclusion which will ineluctably arise from 
coupling Meillassoux’s and Harman’s systems with the 
absolute non-relation as the central link is, as repetitious as it 
may sound, that, to the extent that this world itself, the laws, 
the phenomena, and the existences in it possess the absolute non-
relationality as one of their inscapes, each single one of them is 
essentially beyond any relation, to wit, unable to be reduced to 
or spelled out by its bundle of relations. Certainly, the next step 
that Chiba took to the formulation of “the non-interpretive” 
does not look a bold one; however, it is a critical move. In precis 
and in substance, he insisted that being non-relational should 
involve being non-interpretive; to reword it more legibly, he was 
of the following opinion: that all the existences are literally non-
relational, or more specifically, ultimately closed to themselves, 
must mean that each and every one of them should evermore 
keep an unreachable sphere like an impenetrable bedrock 
which categorically shuts out any attempt by others to access it; 
Chiba (2015) figuratively represented the realm as a “stone-
secret”, which, mark my words, “absolutely forces the 
relinquishment of interpretation” (p. 118). The sentences below 
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eloquently impart how Chiba fused Meillassoux and Harman, 
and then derived “the non-interpretive” therefrom: 
Both the world in Meillassoux’s sense and an object in 
Harman’s sense are what are unfathomable, and no one can 
know what they will become or do. As for the reality that one 
cannot know what will become of an object or what it will do, 
one can do nothing except feel unrest, because any interpretation 
of it is bootless. (Chiba, 2015, p. 119) 
Now one can comprehend why “the non-interpretive” has had 
those meanings I briefed above, how it is supported 
theoretically, and why it can be asserted that all creation is “the 
non-interpretive”. To summarize, by synthesizing the logical 
deductions of Harman and Meillassoux, Chiba first 
demonstrated that everything, in the broadest sense of the 
word, owns the absolute non-relationality among its quiddities, 
whereupon he made a leap of reframing being non-relational as 
being non-interpretive; hence, he concluded, all the existences 
were “the non-interpretive”. 
* 
As anyone would apprehend with ease, Chiba’s argumentation 
is structured in a decently intelligible and rigorous manner, and 
few will venture to disprove the whole logic. Nonetheless, quite 
a few will feel like posing some questions of other kinds: Why 
did Chiba propound the concept which appears to be nihilistic? 
What new perspective will we acquire by acknowledging that 
everything and everyone is “the non-interpretive”? 
Admittedly, in the paper Chiba advanced several 
suggestions that were more or less related to one another; yet, 
the spatial limitation does not allow me to enumerate them one 
by one. Let me get right down to brass tacks instead. He did not 
aim to set forward a pessimistic thesis by absolutizing the non-
relationality/non-interpretiveness. His aim was, in the 
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minimum amount of words possible, to revolutionize our 
worldview, that is, to challenge our preconceptions and set up a 
new perspective from which one can reconsider oneself, others, 
and the world. This condensation will come across one as 
mundane; still, I trust that his inviting exhortation will be found 
really worth hearkening. 
First, although you would have already realized this, we 
should be attentive to the fact that Chiba by no means 
recommended us to renounce all efforts to understand, i.e. 
interpret, other entities and incidents. In lieu, he urged us to 
adopt a twofold approach to society, stating: “Society can be 
considered in a bifold way—interpretively/non-interpretively” 
(Chiba, 2015, p.122). Let me encapsulate his argument. On one 
hand, it is undeniable that we, as social beings in a classical 
phrase, live with various types of bond and daily try to make 
sense of our experiences with others, implicitly presupposing 
that the universe is made up of relations, mutual access is 
possible, and we coexist; this outlook on the world, which can 
be described as an interpretive approach, will indeed impress 
one as a fairly moral and commonsensical one.  
Yet, on the other hand, many will consider it also 
irrefutable that the mechanism of the world at large cannot be 
explicated in that interpretive way alone, as Chiba (2015) 
astutely illustrated: “Each one of us is, to put it in extreme 
terms, a discrete stone. In the face of each other’s fundamentally 
never penetrable stone-secret, we are driven to bafflement ad 
nauseam” (p. 125). By evincing that we and all others are “the 
non-interpretive” deep down, Chiba brought home to us the 
necessity to augment our worldview, or to reanalyze what the 
unknowable indicates in reality, by internalizing the non-
interpretive perspective; it enjoins one to admit that “absolute 
secrets exist disjunctively; they are things and beings that are 
absolutely disrelated from causality and moral law, and 
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unilaterally emit their unique power which one cannot describe 
except as having come ex nihilo” (Chiba, 2015, p. 126). The titles 
of the third and fourth sections of the 2015 paper, “the unreason 
of plurality” and “the non-ethical parallel”, concisely announce 
the kernel of Chiba’s aspiration. When you do not understand 
some object, there is possibility that it is not due to your 
ignorance or finitude as a subject; you may just have come to 
the endmost deadlock, “the genuine termination, one which 
terminates your interpretation by confronting you with the 
principle of mental block in front of something absolutely 
factual” (Chiba, 2015, p. 126). 
For all its ostensibly gloomy predilection, this protreptic 
of Chiba is far from nihilism. He, probably having been acutely 
cognizant of imperfections inhering in positive and moralistic 
views, spurred us to take our head out of the sand, and face up 
to a few facts at which most of us, albeit faintly aware 
somewhere in the recesses of our mind, generally do not want 
to look straight. Unquestionably, it is never comfortable to cop 
to the reality that our friends as well as nobodies are, in the 
deepest sooth, arrantly above our understanding, and may 
unilaterally betray us out of the blue, with no reason, and that 
the being we consider the dearest is on no account more 
accessible than a stone on the curbside. Notwithstanding, 
unless one accepts the ubiquity of the non-interpretive, one 
cannot appreciate the plurality, or diversity in everyday 
vocabulary, of existences, and, without the appreciation, one 
cannot have the slightest chance to gain a partial access to 
others in their own right; besides, and perhaps most 
importantly, Chiba (2015) brought forward an incisive case 
almost at the end of the paper, stating: “Resignation and 
forgiveness may be impossible unless one grants the reality of 
non-causality and non-ethicality” (p. 126). 
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This observation epitomizes what the absolutization of 
“the non-interpretive” can do for us. In brief, by apprehending 
it as a primary, inborn attribute of everything, we can attain a 
novel outlook, according to which, we, whereas being able to 
build up each other’s understanding to a degree, can say 
confidently yes to the given plurality of existences just the way 
it is and welcome a surprise which others may afford at any 
time. 
 
Conclusion: Living in the Non-interpretive World 
In advance of making a concluding comment, let me 
encapsulate the preceding discussion. The first section provided 
an overview of Meillssoux’s Speculative Materialism and 
Harman’s Object-Oriented philosophy; in the second, I 
elucidated the meaning of “the non-interpretive”, how Chiba 
created it, and what novel standpoint we could gain by 
accepting it as a substantial property of all existences. 
Lastly, I would like to experimentally deliberate over how 
the concept of “the non-interpretive” can update our 
worldview which is currently needed to adjust to the world 
which, despite the claims lodged by the proponents of 
globalization, seems to be becoming more and more 
fragmented. In this relativistic, post-truth world, “where 
alternative facts abound, demonstrable evidence is increasingly 
losing its ability to impact people’s entrenched opinions” 
(Kashyap, 2020, para. 5), it is likely that many of the 
sociocultural norms which had been traditionally shared by 
most people will be discredited, and, in my estimation, the 
modern idea that when people argue against each other, the 
more rational and logical argument will prevail is not an 
exception; in other words, truth will not always prevail 
anymore. This proclamation will sound a defeatist retreat, and 
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some will protest by saying that any conflict between human 
beings, who have reason, can theoretically be resolved by an 
exhaustive debate. Nonetheless, the actuality of the world is not 
as such: there has rarely been a reasoned dialogue between, say, 
Keynesians and Marxists, Korea and Japan, and Trumpians and 
anti-Trumpians. Brawls of this kind occur upon the globe all the 
time. 
Allowing for the state of affairs, we ought to change, or at 
least reorganize our mindset; more specifically, the post-truth 
world necessitates us to reconsider what we ought to do when 
we are confronted by other people who firmly hold an opinion 
incompatible with ours. I figure that Chiba’s concept of “the 
non-interpretive” can offer many hints on how to handle such a 
situation. Let us recall the quintessence of his argument: every 
being and everything is “the non-interpretive”, namely, “what 
is absolutely non-relational to any interpretation” (Chiba, 
2016b, para. 32), and “what exists just there, being intrinsic to 
itself” (Chiba, 2015, p, 118). This involves that the life that each 
of us leads goes on according to a totally disparate system 
which is impenetrable to others; to express it radically, each 
single one of us lives, in a sense, in a different world. I suppose 
this is one of the worldviews which can be adopted to live 
through this epoch of alternative facts. This is never a form of 
correlationism or relativism, because both of them, albeit 
acknowledging the plurality of reality, postulate only one 
noumenal world whose dimensions are experienced and 
interpreted differently by existences. 
If one takes the perspective I sketched above, he/she will 
descry another option to respond to those whose world is 
structured by a bundle of facts which is different from that 
which constitutes his/her world. It is neither imposition of 
personal values nor insistence on receiving our opinions; rather, 
it will be to invite others—denizens of different worlds—to visit 
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our world, and, simultaneously, to welcome the otherness of 
their worlds just the way it is. I admit this will strike some 
people as too optimistic to be valid in the actual society where 
individuals scarcely hear opinions which are not congruous 
with theirs; despite that, few will dispute that we should 
constantly fine-tune our worldview so as to adapt to the 
practical conditions. Presuming that literally all are “the non-
interpretive” and that each one of the other beings lives in an 
independent world may, I speculate, help us to do that. As a 
matter of course, this is a proposal, or rather an invitation that I 
want to make in concluding this paper. 
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